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21 Introduction
Bankruptcy situations study problems where an estate must be divided among several claimants. The
problem arises when the estate is not large enough to cover all claims. A typical example is when a firm
goes bankrupt. The objective is to identify well-behaved rules when dividing the estate among agents.
This literature originates in a paper by O’Neill (1982). See Thomson (2003) for a survey on this topic.
In bankruptcy situations each agent’s claim is identified by a number. In many real situations we
divide an estate among a group of agents, as in bankruptcy for instance, but considering that each
agent’s claim is a vector. These kind of problems are called multi-issue allocation (MIA) situations and
were introduced in Calleja et al (2005), which give several examples of real problems in this general
framework. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009), Moreno-Ternero (2009), Gonza´lez-Alco´n et al (2007), Ju et al
(2007), and Bergantin˜os et al (2010) also study MIA situations. Recently, other papers also study well-
known situations from a multi-issue approach. For instance, Marmol and Ponsati (2008) study bargaining
problems over multiple issues, whereas Svensson and Torstensson (2008) study the allocation of multiple
public goods.
In most Spanish Universities, once the total annual operating budget for issues has been decided, it
is the responsibility of the senior administrators in each department to decide the resource allocations
for each issue, being: research, teaching, etc; and submit a quantified request. Once the issue allocations
are finalized, the university will compile the university’s annual operating budget and each department
is notified of the amount assigned to each issue.
This situation can be modeled as a 4-tuple
(
R,N,E, (cki)k∈R,i∈N
)
where R is the set of issues
(research, teaching, ...), N is the set of agents (the departments), E is the estate (the amount the
university has decided to assign to each department), and cki is the claim of agent i on issue k.
In bankruptcy situations a rule is a vector (fi)i∈N where fi is the amount assigned to agent i. In
multi-issue allocation situations, two approaches are possible.
Approach 1: as in bankruptcy, a rule is a vector (fi)i∈N where fi is the amount assigned to agent i.
With this approach we implicitly assume that agents may divide this amount among the different issues
as they please. This approach is followed in Calleja et al (2005), Gonza´lez-Alco´n et al (2007), and Ju et
al (2007).
Approach 2: we first divide the budget among the issues. The amount assigned to each issue is divided
among the agents. With this approach a rule is a matrix (fki)k∈R,i∈N where fki denotes the amount
received by agent i on issue k. No agent can spend part of the amount he receives for an issue, on another
issue. This approach is more popular in several situations. For instance, in the situation mentioned above.
In this paper, we follow this approach as in Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009), Moreno-Ternero (2009), and
Bergantin˜os et al (2010).
In bankruptcy situations the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) rule is one of the most prominent
rules. One important reason supporting this is the economic theory of justice behind its definition,
namely to equalize the awards of the agents. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) generalize the definition of CEA
to MIA situations by using a two-stage procedure. Firstly, the estate is divided among the issues using
the CEA bankruptcy rule. Secondly, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents
using the CEA bankruptcy rule.
3Further evidence in support of CEA derives from the axiomatic approach. In this paper we ob-
tain characterizations of the CEA rule in MIA situations by extending characterizations of the CEA
bankruptcy rule. We focus on three axiomatic characterizations due to Dagan (1996), Herrero and Villar
(2002), and Yeh (2006).
We extend the definition of some properties to MIA situations. Composition up, composition down,
and invariance under claims truncation can be defined in MIA situations as in bankruptcy situations.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy properties of equal treatment of equals, conditional full compensation, and
claims monotonicity cannot be extended so easily. We have decided to extend them by claiming the
principle twice: firstly among the issues and secondly within each issue.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce MIA situations and in Section 3 we
present our results for the CEA rule. The proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Multi-issue allocation situations
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) situation (Calleja et al, 2005), is a 4-tuple (R,N,E,C). R = {1, . . . , r}
is the set of issues. N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. E ≥ 0 is the estate to be divided. C =
(cki)k∈R,i∈N ∈ R
R×N
+ and cki represents the amount claimed by player i ∈ N on issue k ∈ R. We
assume 0 ≤ E ≤
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
cki.
Note that a bankruptcy situation is a MIA situation with |R| = 1.
A multi-issue allocation (MIA) rule f is a map that associates with each MIA situation (R,N,E,C)
a matrix f(R,N,E,C) ∈ RR×N such that 0 ≤ fki(R,N,E,C) ≤ cki for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N ,
and
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) = E.
Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) consider a two-stage procedure to define MIA rules from bankruptcy
rules. Firstly, the estate is divided among the issues following some bankruptcy rule. Later, the amount
assigned to each issue is divided among the agents, who have claimed on that issue, following the same
bankruptcy rule.
Let φ be a bankruptcy rule and let (R,N,E,C) be aMIA situation. The two-stage rule fφ(R,N,E,C)
is the MIA rule obtained from the following two-stage procedure.
1. First stage. Consider the so-called bankruptcy situation among the issues (R,E, cR), where cR =
(cR1 , . . . , c
R
r ) ∈ R
R denotes the vector of total claims in the issues, i.e., cRk =
∑
i∈N
cki for each
k ∈ R. The amount E is divided among the issues using the bankruptcy rule φ. Thus, we obtain
φ(R,E, cR) ∈ RR.
2. Second stage. For each k ∈ R, consider the bankruptcy situation given by (N, φk(R,E, c
R), (cki)i∈N )
and apply again φ. For each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N , fφ
ki
(R,N,E,C) = φi(N,φk(R,E, c
R), (cki)i∈N ).
If we consider the bankruptcy rule φ = CEA in the procedure defined above, we obtain the CEA
rule for MIA situations.
The constrained equal awards (CEA) rule is the two-stage MIA rule fCEA. Thus, for each (R,N,E,C),
each k ∈ R, and each i ∈ N , fCEAki (R,N,E,C) = min{λk, cki}, where for each k ∈ R, λk satisfies∑
i∈N
min{λk, cki} = min{λ,
∑
i∈N
cki}, and λ satisfies
∑
k∈R
min{λ,
∑
i∈N
cki} = E.
4Note that if |R| = 1, the MIA situation is a bankruptcy situation. Thus, the CEA rule for MIA
situations coincides with the CEA rule in bankruptcy problems.
3 Main results
In this section we extend the definition of some properties to MIA situations. Composition up, compo-
sition down, and invariance under claims truncation can be defined in MIA situations in the same way
as in bankruptcy situations, with the same meaning.
Composition up (CU). For each (R,N,E,C) and each E′ ∈ R with 0 ≤ E′ ≤ E, f(R,N,E,C) =
f(R,N,E′, C) + f(R,N,E −E′, C − f(R,N,E′, C)).
Composition down (CD). For each (R,N,E,C) and each E′ ∈ R such that E′ ≥ E, f(R,N,E,C) =
f(R,N,E, f(R,N,E′, C)).
Remark 1. Herrero and Villar (2001) prove that, in bankruptcy situations, either composition up or
composition down imply a property called continuity in the estate. A bankruptcy rule ψ satisfies this
property if, for each sequence of bankruptcy problems {(N,Es, c)}∞s=1 and each bankruptcy problem
(N,E, c) such that (N,Es, c)→ (N,E, c), ψ(N,Es, c)→ ψ(N,E, c).
We can also assert that if a MIA rule f satisfies composition up (or composition down) then
fki(R,N,E,C) is continuous in E, for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N . We prove the statement for the case
of composition up. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Invariance under claims truncation (ICT ). For each (R,N,E,C), f(R,N,E,C) = f(R,N,E,CE),
where CE ∈ RR×N+ is such that c
E
ki = min{cki, E} for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N .
Nevertheless, some bankruptcy properties like equal treatment of equals, conditional full compensa-
tion, and claims monotonicity cannot be extended so easily.
In bankruptcy situations, equal treatment of equals states that two agents i and j with the same
claim (ci = cj), should receive the same amount (fi = fj). A straightforward generalization to MIA
situations is that if two agents i and j have the same vector of claims (cki = ckj for each k ∈ R), they
should receive the same amount in each issue (fki = fkj for each k ∈ R). Several MIA rules satisfying
CU , ICT , and this property of equal treatment of equals exist. Since this axiom is too weak, we are
interested in a stronger notion of equal treatment. The idea is to claim the principle twice. Firstly, if
the total claim over two issues is the same, then the total amount assigned to both issues must coincide.
Secondly, if two agents have the same claim in an issue, then both agents must receive the same amount
in this issue.
Equal treatment between the issues (ETB). For each (R,N,E,C) and each k, l ∈ R such that∑
i∈N
cki =
∑
i∈N
cli,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fli(R,N,E,C).
Equal treatment within the issues (ETW ). For each (R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R and each i, j ∈ N such
that cki = ckj , fki(R,N,E,C) = fkj(R,N,E,C).
ETW was introduced in Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009).
5Next, we extend conditional full compensation and claims monotonicity to MIA situations following
the same idea as with equal treatment of equals.
Conditional full compensation between the issues (FCB). For each (R,N,E,C) and each k ∈ R such
that
∑
l∈R
min
{ ∑
i∈N
cki,
∑
i∈N
cli
}
≤ E,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
cki.
Suppose that the estate is sufficient large to satisfy all the claims in the issues truncated by the total
claim in issue k. FCB says that the total amount allocated to issue k must coincide with its total claim.
Note that FCB can be rewritten as fki(R,N,E,C) = cki for all i ∈ N instead of
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =∑
i∈N
cki.
Conditional full compensation within the issues (FCW ). For each (R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R, and each
i ∈ N such that
∑
j∈N
min
{
cki, ckj
}
≤
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C), then fki(R,N,E,C) = cki.
Suppose that the total allocation for an issue k is enough to cover all the agents’ claims in issue k
truncated by the demand of agent i in issue k. According to FCW , agent i must receive his claim in
issue k.
Claims monotonicity between the issues (CMB). For each (R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R, and each
(R,N,E,C′) such that
∑
i∈N
cki ≤
∑
i∈N
c′ki and cli = c
′
li for each l ∈ R\{k} and each i ∈ N ,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) ≤∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C
′).
CMB says that if the total claim of an issue increases, then the total allocation to this issue cannot
decrease.
Claims monotonicity within the issues (CMW ). For each (R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R, each i ∈ N, and
each (R,N,E,C′) such that cki ≤ c
′
ki and clj = c
′
lj otherwise, fki(R,N,E,C) ≤ fki(R,N,E,C
′).
CMW says that if the claim of an agent in an issue increases and the rest of the claims remain the
same, then the allocation of the agent in this issue cannot decrease.
Following we present three characterizations of the CEA rule by means of these properties. These
characterizations generalize to MIA situations the characterizations of the CEA bankruptcy rule given
in Theorem 4 of Thomson (2003).
Theorem 1 The CEA rule is the only rule satisfying:
(a) CU , ICT , ETB, and ETW .
(b) CD, FCB, and FCW .
(c) FCB, FCW , CMB, and CMW .
Proof. See the Appendix.
All the properties used in the characterizations given in Theorem 1 are independent. In the Appendix
we provide a list of rules satisfying all the properties except one for each characterization.
Remark 2. Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) obtain a characterization of the CEA rule with CU, ICT, ETI,
and other two properties called the quotient property and equal treatment for the issues. Although it
is trivial to note that ETB implies equal treatment for the issues, ETB and the quotient property are
not related. It is also trivial to observe that the quotient property and equal treatment for the issues
6imply ETB. This means that Theorem 1 (a) cannot be obtained as a consequence of the results of
Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009).
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of the statement in Remark 1
The proof is similar to the proof in Herrero and Villar (2001).
Let f be a MIA rule satisfying composition up and let (R,N,E,C) be a MIA situation. Consider
the sequence {Es}∞s=1, such that E
s → E. By definition of the MIA rules, we know that for each k ∈ R
and i ∈ N the sequence {fki(R,N,E
s, C)}∞s=1 is bounded by 0 and cki. So, it is sufficient to prove that
if a subsequence {fki(R,N,E
sq , C)}∞sq=1 ⊂ {fki(R,N,E
s, C)}∞s=1 satisfies that there exists x ∈ R such
that fki(R,N,E
sq , C)→ x, then x = fki(R,N,E,C).
– Suppose that x > fki(R,N,E,C).
By definition of theMIA rules, we can find δ > 0 such that fki(R,N, δ,C
′) < x−fki(R,N,E,C), with
C′ = C − f(R,N,E,C). By composition up, fki(R,N,E+ δ, C) = fki(R,N,E,C)+ fki(R,N, δ, C
′).
Thus, fki(R,N,E + δ,C) < x.
On the other hand, it is straightforward to deduce that composition up implies monotonicity in the
estate. Since Es → E, applying monotonicity in the estate we obtain that fki(R,N,E + δ, C) ≥ x,
which is a contradiction.
– Assume that x < fki(R,N,E,C).
By definition of the MIA rules, we can find δ > 0 such that fki(R,N, δ, C
′) < fki(R,N,E,C) − x,
where C′ = C − f(R,N,E − δ, C). By composition up, fki(R,N,E − δ, C) = fki(R,N,E,C) −
fki(R,N, δ, C
′). Thus, fki(R,N,E − δ, C) > x.
On the other hand, since Es → E, applying monotonicity in the estate fki(R,N,E − δ, C) ≤ x,
which is a contradiction.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (a)
This result generalizes Dagan (1996). The idea behind the proof of the uniqueness in Dagan (1996) is
the following. By CU we can divide the estate step by step. In the initial step we divide an amount small
enough that after truncating agent´s claims by this amount, all claims are the same. By equal treatment
all agents receive the same part of this amount.
Our proof is based on the same idea but it is more complicated. We apply the idea twice. In the
first claim we prove that the total amount assigned to each issue is unique. In the second claim we prove
that the amount assigned to each agent in each issue is unique. Moreover, in each claim the arguments
needed to obtain the conclusion are more complicated than in Dagan (1996). For instance, statement 2
of the proof of Claim 1 is trivial in Dagan’s proof, but not in our case.
In Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) it is proved that CEA satisfies CU , ICT , and ETW . It is straightfor-
ward to prove that CEA also satisfies ETB.
7The uniqueness is a consequence of the following claims:
Claim 1. If a rule satisfies CU , ICT , and ETB then, for each (R,N,E,C) and each k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C).
Claim 2. If a rule f satisfies CU , ICT , ETB, and ETW , then f = fCEA.
Proof of Claim 1. We prove it by induction on the number of issues with a positive claim. We
denote p(R,N,E,C) =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
k ∈ R :
∑
i∈N
cki > 0
}∣∣∣∣∣.
Suppose that p(R,N,E,C) = 1, i.e., there exists a unique k ∈ R such that cRk > 0. Thus,∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) = E and
∑
i∈N
fli(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAli (R,N,E,C) =
0 for each l 6= k.
Suppose the result holds for p(R,N,E,C) = τ . We prove it when p(R,N,E,C) = τ + 1.
We define the sequence of MIA situations {(R,N,Es, Cs)}∞s=1 where (E
0, C0) = (0, C). Assume
that we have defined (R,N,Es, Cs). We define (R,N,Es+1, Cs+1) as follows:
– For each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N , cs+1
ki
= cski − fki(R,N,E
s, Cs).
– Let ks+1 be such that
∑
i∈N
cs+1
ks+1i
= min
k∈R
{ ∑
i∈N
cs+1
ki
:
∑
i∈N
cs+1
ki
> 0
}
. We define Es+1 =
∑
i∈N
cs+1
ks+1i
n
.
Let t be such that
t∑
s=0
Es < E. For each k ∈ R we prove the following items:
1. For each i ∈ N ,
fki(R,N,E,C) =
t∑
s=0
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) + fki
(
R,N,E −
t∑
s=0
Et, Ct+1
)
.
2. For each s = 0, . . . , t,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs).
3.
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) =
t∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs)
+
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,E −
t∑
s=0
Et, Ct+1
)
.
4.
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C).
We now prove the four items.
1. By definition, C1 = C. Since f satisfies CU , for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N ,
fki(R,N,E,C) = fki(R,N,E
1, C1) + fki(R,N,E − E
1, C1 − f(R,N,E1, C1))
= fki(R,N,E
1, C1) + fki(R,N,E − E
1, C2).
8Repeating this argument we obtain that
fki(R,N,E,C) =
t∑
s=0
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) + fki
(
R,N,E −
t∑
s=0
Et, Ct+1
)
.
2. Since E0 = 0, for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N , fki(R,N,E
0, C0) = 0 = fCEAki (R,N,E
0, C0).
Let s ≤ t. Since f satisfies ICT we have that
f(R,N,Es, Cs) = f
(
R,N,Es, (Cs)E
s
)
,
where (cski)
Es = min {cski, E
s} for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N .
Let (R,N,E,Cs∗) be such that for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N ,
cs∗ki =


0 if
∑
i∈N
cski = 0
min {βsk , c
s
ki} if
∑
i∈N
cski > 0
where βsk ≥ 0 satisfies
∑
i∈N
min{βsk, c
s
ki}
n
= Es. Since f satisfies ICT
f(R,N,Es, Cs∗) = f(R,N,Es, (Cs∗)E
s
).
It is trivial to see that βsk ≥ E
s when
∑
i∈N
cski > 0. Thus, (C
s)E
s
= (Cs∗)E
s
. Now, f(R,N,Es, Cs) =
f(R,N,Es, (Cs)E
s
) = f(R,N,Es, (Cs∗)E
s
) = f(R,N,Es, Cs∗).
For each k ∈ R we have two possibilities:
(a)
∑
i∈N
cski = 0. Then,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs) = 0.
(b)
∑
i∈N
cski > 0. Since
∑
i∈N
cs∗li = nE
s when
∑
i∈N
csli > 0 and f satisfies ETB,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) =
Es
p(R,N,Es, Cs)
=
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs).
3. By 2, for each k ∈ R and u ≤ t,
∑
i∈N
cu+1
ki
=
∑
i∈N
[
cki −
u∑
s=0
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs)
]
.
So, by definition of fCEA, for each u ≤ t,
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
u+1, Cu+1) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,Eu+1, C −
u∑
s=0
fCEA(R,N,Es, Cs)
)
.
Assume that t = 1. Since fCEA satisfies CU , for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N ,
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) = f
CEA
ki (R,N,E
1, C1)
+ fCEAki (R,N,E − E
1, C − fCEA(R,N,E1, C1)).
9Then,
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,E1, C1
)
+
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,E − E1, C2
)
.
Repeating the same argument we can prove that 3 also holds when t > 1.
4. We distinguish three cases:
(a) There exists t ∈ N such that
t∑
s=0
Es < E ≤
t+1∑
s=0
Es. By 1, 2, 3, and CU it is enough to prove that
for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N ,
∑
i∈N
fki
(
R,N,E −
t∑
s=0
Es, Ct+1
)
=
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,E −
t∑
s=0
Es, Ct+1
)
.
Since E −
t∑
s=0
Es ≤ Et+1 we know that if there exists l ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N
ct+1
li
> 0, then
∑
i∈N
ct+1
li
≥ nEt+1 ≥ n
(
E −
t∑
s=0
Es
)
. Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of 2,
we can deduce it.
(b)
∞∑
s=0
Es = E. By 1 and 2 for each u ∈ N and k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) ≥
u∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs).
By 2 and 3 for each u ∈ N and k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) ≥
u∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs).
Since
∞∑
s=0
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E
s, Cs) =
∞∑
s=0
Es = E, for each k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C).
(c)
∞∑
s=0
Es < E. Since f and fCEA satisfies CU , for each k ∈ R and each i ∈ N ,
fki(R,N,E,C) = fki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
+ fki
(
R,N,E −
∞∑
s=0
Es, C − f
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
))
and fCEAki (R,N,E,C) =
fCEAki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
+ fCEAki
(
R,N,E −
∞∑
s=0
Es, C − fCEA
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
))
.
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We have proved that
∑
i∈N
fki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
=
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
. Then, it is
enough to prove that
∑
i∈N
fki
(
R,N,E −
∞∑
s=0
Es, C − f
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
))
=
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,E −
∞∑
s=0
Es, C − fCEA
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
))
.
We do it by using the induction argument.
Because of the definition of (R,N,Es, Cs), if
∑
i∈N
cki > 0, then
∑
i∈N
cski > 0 for s = 0, 1, . . ..
Besides, for each l ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N
cli > 0
∑
i∈N
cs+1li =
∑
i∈N
csli −
∑
i∈N
fli(R,N,E
s, Cs) =
∑
i∈N
csli −
Es
τ + 1
=
∑
i∈N
cli −
s∑
t=1
Et
τ + 1
.
Choose k ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N
cki = min
l∈R
{ ∑
i∈N
cli :
∑
i∈N
cli > 0
}
. Hence, for all s ≥ 1,
Es =
∑
i∈N
cki
n
(
1−
1
n(τ + 1)
)s−1
.
Then,
∞∑
s=0
Es =
∑
i∈N
cki
n

 1
1−
(
1−
1
n(τ + 1)
)


= (τ + 1)
∑
i∈N
cki.
Thus,
∞∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) =
∞∑
s=0
Es
τ + 1
=
∑
i∈N
cki.
Let ε > 0. There exists u ∈ N such that
u∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) >
∑
i∈N
cki − ε.
Therefore,
∑
i∈N
fki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
≥
u∑
s=0
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E
s, Cs) >
∑
i∈N
cki − ε.
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Then, ∑
i∈N
fki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
=
∑
i∈N
fCEAki
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
)
=
∑
i∈N
cki.
Since
p
(
R,N,E −
∞∑
s=0
Es, C − f
(
R,N,
∞∑
s=0
Es, C
))
≤ τ
and the induction hypothesis, the result holds.
Proof of Claim 2. Let (R,N,E,C) be a MIA situation and f a rule satisfying CU, ICT, ETB,
and ETW .
By Claim 1,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C).
In addition, as a direct consequence of the definition of fCEA,
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) = CEAk(R,E, c
R).
Thus, ∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) = CEAk(R,E, c
R).
Lorenzo-Freire et al (2009) show in Claims 2 and 3 of Theorem 1 that this result, together with CU ,
ICT , and ETW imply that f(R,N,E,C) = fCEA(R,N,E,C). So, following a similar argument, we
can prove that Claim 2 is true.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1 (b)
Since the CEA bankruptcy rule satisfies conditional full compensation, it is obvious that the CEA MIA
rule satisfies FCB and FCW.
We now prove that CEA satisfies CD. Let (R,N,E,C) and E′ ≥ E.
Let k ∈ R and i ∈ N . We know that
fCEAki (R,N,E,C) = f
CEA
ki
(
{k}, N, fCEAk1 (R, {1}, E, c
R), (ckj)j∈N
)
.
Since 0 ≤ fCEAk1 (R, {1}, E, c
R) ≤ fCEAk1 (R, {1}, E
′, cR) and the CEA bankruptcy rule satisfies CD,
last expression coincides with
fCEAki ({k}, N, f
CEA
k1 (R, {1}, E, c
R), fCEA({k}, N, fCEAk1 (R, {1}, E
′, cR), (ckj)j∈N ))
= fCEAki ({k}, N, f
CEA
k1 (R, {1}, E, c
R), (fCEAkj (R,N,E
′, C))j∈N ).
Since the CEA bankruptcy rule satisfies CD,
fCEAki
(
{k}, N, fCEAk1 (R, {1}, E, f
CEA(R, {1}, E′, cR)),
(
fCEAkj (R,N,E
′, C)
)
j∈N
)
= fCEAki (R,N,E, f
CEA(R,N,E′, C)).
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We now prove the uniqueness through the following claims.
Claim 3. If a rule f satisfies CD and FCB, then for each (R,N,E,C) and each k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
min{λ, cRk } with λ such that
∑
k∈R
min{λ, cRk } = E.
Claim 4. If a rule f satisfies CD, FCB, and FCW , then f = fCEA.
Proof of Claim 3. Yeh (2004) proves in Theorem 1 that the CEA bankruptcy rule is the only
bankruptcy rule satisfying composition down and conditional full compensation. Using similar arguments
to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2004) we can prove Claim 3.
Proof of Claim 4. By Claim 3, for each k ∈ R,
∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) =
∑
i∈N
fCEAki (R,N,E,C).
Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2004) we can prove Claim
4.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 1 (c)
It is easy to show that CEA satisfies FCB, FCW , CMB, and CMW . To prove that uniqueness holds,
it is sufficient to prove the following claims.
Claim 5. If f satisfies FCB and CMB then, for (R,N,E,C) and each k ∈ R,∑
i∈N
fki(R,N,E,C) = min{λ, c
R
k } with λ such that
∑
k∈R
min{λ, cRk } = E.
Claim 6. If f satisfies FCB, FCW , CMB, and CMW , then f = fCEA.
Proof of Claim 5. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2006) and we omit it.
Proof of Claim 6. It is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Yeh (2006) and we omit it.
4.5 Independence of the properties used in Theorem 1
Note that in the two-stage procedure defined to obtain MIA rules from bankruptcy rules, two differ-
ent bankruptcy rules could be used. Let ψ and φ be two bankruptcy rules. Given a MIA situation
(R,N,E,C), the two-stage rule f{ψ,φ} is the rule obtained when we first apply the rule ψ to divide
the estate among the issues and later, the amount assigned to each issue is divided among the agents
claiming on this issue applying the rule φ.
We define several rules.
– Let fCEL be the two-stage constrained equal losses rule defined for each (R,N,E,C), each k ∈ R,
and each i ∈ N , by fCELki (R,N,E,C) = max{0, cki − λk}, where for each k ∈ R, λk satisfies∑
i∈N
max{0, cki − λk} = max{0, c
R
k − λ} and λ satisfies
∑
k∈R
max{0, cRk − λ} = E.
– Let fT be the two-stage Talmud rule defined as fT (R,N,E,C) =
=


fCEA(R,N,E,C/2) if
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
cki/2 ≥ E
C/2− fCEL
(
R,N,E −
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
cki/2, C/2
)
otherwise.
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– Given a bankruptcy situation (N,E, c) and σ ∈ Π(N) (the set of orders over N). We define the
priority rule σ as
σi(N,E, c) = min
{
max
{
0, E −
∑
j:σ−1(j)<σ−1(i)
cj
}
, ci
}
.
– Given a MIA situation (R,N,E,C), consider the bankruptcy situation that arises when we consider
as set of agents R×N , i.e., (R×N,E, (cki)(k,i)∈R×N ). Let ξ be the CEA bankruptcy rule applied
to (R×N,E, (cki)(k,i)∈R×N ). Then, ξki(R,N,E,C) = min{α, cki} for each k ∈ R and i ∈ N , where
α satisfies
∑
k∈R
∑
i∈N
min{α, cki} = E.
– Consider the bankruptcy rule δ defined by Herrero and Villar (2002). Let N0 = ∅. We define recur-
sively,
yk = min

cj : j ∈ N \

⋃
s<k
Ns(c)



 and
Nk(c) =
{
i ∈ N : ci = y
k
}
.
Given i ∈ Nk(c),
δi(N,E, c) =


0 if 0 ≤ E ≤
∑
s<k
|Ns(c)|y
s
E −
∑
s<k
|Ns(c)|y
s
|Nk(c)|
if
∑
s<k
|Ns(c)|y
s < E ≤
∑
s≤k
|Ns(c)|y
s
ci if
∑
s≤k
|Ns(c)|y
s < E.
The following tables show that the properties used in Theorem 1 are independent. The proofs are
left to the reader.
Table 1 Independence of the properties in Theorem 1 (a)
Properties / Rules fCEL fT fCEA,σ ξ
ICT No Yes Yes Yes
CU Yes No Yes Yes
ETW Yes Yes No Yes
ETB Yes Yes Yes No
Table 2 Independence of the properties in Theorem 1 (b)
Properties / Rules f{CEL,CEA} f{CEA,CEL} f{δ,CEA}
FCB No Yes Yes
FCW Yes No Yes
CD Yes Yes No
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Table 3 Independence of the properties in Theorem 1 (c)
Properties / Rules f{CEL,CEA} f{CEA,CEL} f{δ,CEA} f{CEA,δ}
FCB No Yes Yes Yes
FCW Yes No Yes Yes
CMB Yes Yes No Yes
CMW Yes Yes Yes No
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